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PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM IN AUSTRALIA:
A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL*

Binh Tran-Nam and Linh Vu
Australian School of Taxation (Atax)
University of New South Wales
Sydney Australia
Brian Andrew
School of Law and Business
Charles Darwin University
Darwin Australia
Australian personal income tax (PIT) currently faces major problems. Recent calls
for PIT reform have been made from many quarters of Australian society. This
paper reports on some early findings of an ARC Linkage project on PIT reform.
In the first phase of this project, STINMOD, a microsimulation model, is used to
construct and test a series of hypothetical PIT packages in order to establish which
packages can best deliver the required policy outcomes. Under the principles of
revenue-neutrality and incrementality, a preferred PIT package with a broader tax
base and a flatter tax rate structure is derived. It is shown that this PIT proposal
outperforms the current PIT with respect to all traditional criteria for good tax
policy.

1. INTRODUCTION

The governments of developed economies have been employing personal income
taxation (PIT) as an important means to raise public revenue. PIT wields considerable
inﬂuence over the three dimensions of public policy, namely resource allocation,
income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation. In terms of aggregate revenue,
PIT has been the most important single tax in most Organisation of Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD) countries.1 This is particularly true in the case
of Australia, which has traditionally relied on PIT as its most signiﬁcant source
*

This paper is derived from an ARC Linkage Project undertaken at Atax. Financial
support from the ARC and CPA Australia is gratefully acknowledged. Comments from
Garry Addison and Chris Evans, and from two anonymous referees helped to improve
the paper. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors.

1

In 2003, PIT (including social security contributions by employees) accounted, on
average, for 33.4% of total tax revenue in OECD countries, making it the largest revenue
source in the OECD (OECD, 2007: 60–61).
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of revenue for the Commonwealth Government in particular and the government
sector in general. PIT directly affects a large part of the Australian population, as
currently about 55 per cent of the Australian population is required to lodge tax
returns on an annual basis.2
Since the mid 1980s, many OECD countries have engaged in fundamental
PIT reforms. These reforms have been driven by the efficiency criterion of good
tax policy and, to a much lesser extent, equity and simplicity considerations.
Australia’s PIT reform has largely followed the OECD norm. In the 1980s and
1990s, the ALP Federal Government introduced a number of significant tax policy
and administration reforms. These include, for example, tax base broadening (for
example, the introduction of the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Fringe Benefits Tax
(FBT) and the removal of a number of major tax concessions in 1985), significant
reduction in PIT rates, self assessment and attempts to simplify the income tax law
(for example, the Tax Law Improvement Project).
Since it was first elected to office in 1996, the Federal Coalition Government
has been preoccupied with indirect and business tax reform. In fact, the re-election
of the Howard Government in 1998 on the platform of a broad-based consumption
tax reform proposal was unprecedented in Australia’s federal history. Since the
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on 1 July 2000,3 the Coalition
Government has not appeared to have any concrete plan for systemic PIT tax reform.
In order to fulfill its election tax package, the Howard Government has moved the
thresholds for the top tax brackets upward and reduced the top marginal PIT rates in
recent Budgets.4 However, the basic structure of the Australian PIT system (in terms
of tax base, tax rate and tax administration) has remained largely unchanged.
There has been a growing recognition in Australia that the process of tax
reform is an unfinished business. Recent calls for PIT reform have been repeatedly
made from virtually all sectors of the Australian community, including academia,
think tanks, professional organisations, business and welfare lobbies, religious
institutions and the political parties themselves (see, for example, ACOSS, 2003;
Business Coalition for Tax Reform, 2005; Business Council of Australia, 2005;
CPA Australia, 2004; Freebairn, 2005; Humphreys, 2005, Saunders, 2006, Tran2

In the tax year 2003–04, about 11.0 million individual taxpayers lodged returns (ATO,
2006: 7) while the corresponding population was approximately 20.0 million (ABS,
2006a: 104, Table 5.1).

3

The introduction of the GST was not completely successful. Following the introduction
of the GST, the real GDP growth rate declined markedly from 3.8% in 1999–2000 to
2.1% 2000–01 (ABS, 2006a: 667, Table 29.1).

4

Despite the Howard Government’s pledge of revenue-neutral tax reform, the overall tax
burden (tax revenue relative to GDP) increased from 31.5% in 1999–2000 to 32.0% in
2000–01, but fell to 31.6% in 2003–04 (ABS, 2006a: 647, Table 27.13 and 670, Table
29.5). Thus, the recent PIT cuts could be seen as the Government’s attempt to maintain
revenue neutrality.
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Nam et al., 2006; Turnbull and Temple, 2005). All of these calls have two points in
common. Firstly, the current Australian PIT performs poorly in relation to the three
traditional criteria for good tax policy, namely, equity, efficiency and simplicity.
Secondly, a comprehensive, systemic reform is required to produce a sustainable
PIT–transfer system that can generate sufficient revenue, protect the needy and yet
deliver enhanced equity, efficiency, simplicity and transparency.
However, when it comes to the details, there is little agreement. In fact, the
specific proposals appear to vary quite considerably, ranging from a radical, flat
tax proposal (see Humphreys, 2005) to more conventional PIT reform proposals
(see Turnbull and Temple, 2005). Perhaps the views put forward by researchers
associated with the Centre of Independent Studies and published collectively in a
single volume edited by Saunders (2006) are the most radical. Their main arguments
and proposals can be summarised as follows:
(a) Australia is not a low-taxing country in view of either the weighted average
level of taxation in the OECD or Australia’s main trading partners. Also,
Australia has a comparatively high reliance on income taxation.
(b) The government could get more revenue by cutting top marginal PIT rates
(that is, Australia is currently on the falling side of a Laffer curve).
(c) Families should be allowed to choose whether or not to pool part or all
of their incomes for tax purposes (that is, the tax unit can be either the
individual or the family).
(d) Individuals should be allowed to earn at least a subsistence income before
paying any income tax (that is, the tax free threshold should be substantially
raised and indexed to inflation).
(e) A proportionate income tax system is fair while a progressive income tax is
not.
(f) The preferred PIT–transfer reform package is a flat tax at 30 per cent,
together with a very high tax free threshold and a negative income tax.
The primary purpose of this paper is to report some findings of an ongoing
Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage project on PIT reform, currently being
undertaken by a research team at the Australian School of Taxation (Atax) of the
University of New South Wales. Atax’s industry partner for this project is CPA
Australia, which has an active and long-standing interest in tax reform in Australia.
However, it should be emphasised from the outset that this project is conducted
by Atax researchers whose work is completely independent of CPA Australia. The
emphasis of this paper is on the modelling aspect of the project. In particular, a
“preferred” PIT reform package will be derived, proposed and discussed.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of Australia’s current PIT system. It also briefly reviews some of the
well-known key defects of the Australian PIT system. Section 3 outlines the general
principles and specific aims of the reform strategy, while Section 4 discusses the
research methodology of the project. Section 5 presents a specific PIT reform
package derived from a microsimulation exercise using STINMOD 05B. It is
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shown that this package outperforms the current PIT system with respect to the
traditional criteria for good tax policy. Some final remarks will then be provided
in the concluding section.
2. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION
Although PIT can be constitutionally levied by State Governments, the Commonwealth of Australia has been the sole imposer of PIT since 1942.5 The PIT is
collected by the Australian Taxation Ofﬁce (ATO) in accordance with the Income
Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936 (Cth), ITAA 1997 (Cth) and others, including the
Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth). There are effectively three sources of taxation
law in Australia:
• statute law (or legislation) made by the Parliament and contained in statutes
such as the ITAA 1936 and ITAA 1997, along with regulations made under
such Acts;
• case law (or common law) created by the decisions of courts and tribunals,
and
• ATO practice and rulings (that is, the ways in which the ATO administers and
applies the law through rulings, assessments and enforcement practices).6
The tax unit in Australia is the individual, although there are tax rebates to reflect
demographic differences between families. Further, some classes of income may
be split (property and business income) while others may not (wages and salaries;
there is still some ambiguity regarding the treatment of personal services income,
which may vary depending on the precise nature of the recipient entity). Thanks to
the base broadening reforms of the 1980s, the definition of assessable income is now
more comprehensive and includes earnings from employment or self-employment,
rental income, interest, dividend income, capital gains, social security payments
(unless exempted), etc.7 Double taxation of dividend income is avoided through
the imputation system, which provides franking credits to resident shareholders.
However, tax on business and investment income can often be reduced via the
use of entities such as partnerships, companies and trusts. In addition, as in most
5

In 1942, the Commonwealth seized control of income tax under the Defence Power
granted by s51(vi) of the Commonwealth Constitution and introduced the “uniform
taxation system” which still operates today. Under this system, the States ceased to collect
income taxes in order to receive grants from the Commonwealth. If any State Government
attempts to collect any amount of income tax, its grant from the Commonwealth would
be reduced by the same amount. It is thus not politically viable for any State Government
to impose income taxes.

6

From a legal purist perspective, the Commissioner’s rulings are not law but merely
represent his view of the law.

7

Employees’ fringe benefits do not form part of their taxable income as they are specifically
taxed under the Fringe Benefits Tax.
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countries, owner-occupied housing is treated preferentially via a CGT exemption
and the non-inclusion of imputed rental income in the tax base, but interest on
borrowing to finance such properties is not tax deductible and State governments
impose stamp duty on housing purchases. In addition, there are many allowable
deductions and concessions in the PIT system for individual non-business taxpayers,
such as work related deductions, negative gearing, capital gains tax discount, and
the Senior Australian Tax Offset. Australia relies on a comprehensive tax system
in which realised income from all sources is combined and taxed at the same rate
according to the legislated schedule. The only exception is capital gains.8 The PIT
schedule is progressive, with five rates (excluding the Medicare levy) ranging
through 0%, 15%, 30%, 40% and 45% for Australian residents. The current top
tax bracket commences at $150,000 per annum which corresponds roughly to 3.4
times the average weekly earnings in Australia.9
In terms of aggregate revenue, the PIT has been by far the largest single tax
in Australia for many years. In 2003–04, PIT raised a net revenue of $95.5 billion
(ATO 2006: 10), accounting for about 67% of income tax revenue or about 48%
of all Commonwealth tax revenue (ABS, 2006a: 647).10 Relative to the general
government sector, PIT generated 39% of all tax revenue in 2003–04 (ABS, 2006a:
647, Table 27.13), while relative to the entire economy, PIT accounted for 12% of
GDP in the same year (ABS, 2006a: 670, Table 29.5).
The administration of the Australian PIT has been an immense task, primarily
because, under the current legislation, virtually all Australian individual taxpayers are
required to submit their annual returns to the ATO. According to the latest taxation
statistics available, 11.0 million individual taxpayers lodged returns in 2003–04
(ATO, 2006: 10). About 8.1 million returns (that is, 74% of the total number) were
submitted by tax agents and 7.9 million returns (that is, 72% of the total) were lodged
through electronic lodgment. Individual taxpayers had total income of $414.1 billion,
taxable income of $394.7 billion and net tax payable of $95.5 billion, giving an
overall effective PIT rate of about 24.2% for all PIT taxpayers. Individual taxpayers
claimed $22.9 billion in total deductions, including $11.1 billion in work-related
expenses. Further, around 7.5 million individual taxpayers were assessed to be
entitled to tax offsets and credits totalling $11.6 billion.
To place Australia’s reliance on PIT in an international context, Table 1 presents
8

If assets are held for 12 months or less, capital gains are included in assessable income.
If assets are held for more than 12 months, only 50% of capital gains are included in
assessable income. Assets acquired before 20 September 1985 are generally exempt
from CGT.

9

In August 2006, the average of all employees’ total earnings in Australia was estimated
at $839.50 per week, corresponding to an annual total earnings of $43,654 (ABS,
2006b).

10

These ratios are derived by combining data provided by the ATO and ABS, which are
not strictly compatible, possibly due to some statistical adjustments.
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PIT and social security contributions by employees as a percentage of total tax
receipts in selected OECD member countries in 2003. Unlike most other member
countries of the OECD, Australia does not impose social security contributions on
employees. When social security contributions by employees are excluded from PIT
revenue, Australia’s reliance on PIT appears to be very high relative to the rest of
the OECD. However, when social security contributions are incorporated into the
PIT base, Australia’s reliance on PIT becomes more similar to those found in other
OECD member countries. While Australia has a higher reliance on PIT than Japan,
the UK and the OECD as a whole (in terms of simple average), it relies relatively
less on PIT than most other comparable countries such as Canada, Germany, New
Zealand and the US.
TABLE 1
PIT AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS BY EMPLOYEES
(AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TAX RECEIPTS) IN SELECTED
OECD COUNTRIES, 2003
Country
Australia
Canada
Germany
Japan
New Zealand
UK
US
EU Average
OECD Average
Source: OECD (2007: 60–61).

PIT
38.5
34.5
23.9
17.5
41.9
28.7
35.3
35.0
24.9

Social Security
Contributions by
Employees
0.0
6.3
17.7
16.5
0.0
7.5
11.7
9.4
9.4

PIT and Social
Security
Contributions
38.5
40.8
41.6
34.0
41.9
36.2
47.0
44.4
33.4

The tax literature has identified many problems in the Australian PIT–transfer
system. Some of the main issues, discussed by reference to the traditional criteria
for good tax policy, are summarised below.
2.1 Revenue Security

Revenue security is important, not only to those who are dependent on government
support (welfare recipients in particular), but also to taxpayer conﬁdence in general.
The Australian PIT base has been undermined over the years by a combination of
allowable deductions and exemptions, tax planning (deliberate shifting of work
and investment from relatively highly taxed options to lower taxed options), tax
avoidance (abusive tax planning) and tax evasion. The estimation of the extent of
tax evasion arising from the cash economy is difﬁcult and very sensitive to the
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underlying assumptions used to construct it. Numerical estimates of the size of the
Australian cash economy relative to ofﬁcial GDP range from 4.8% (see ABS, 2003)
to 13.6% (see Bajada, 2001).11 Although Bajada’s estimate has been criticised by
many as being implausibly high (see, for example, ABS, 2003 and Breusch, 2005),
recent studies have nevertheless suggested that Australia has a resilient cash economy
which is not particularly responsive to tax reform.
2.2 Equity
Equity in taxation is concerned with the principles of horizontal and vertical equity.
Both these principles are violated primarily due to the use of tax planning which
arises from a variety of tax exemptions, concessions, deductions and shelters currently
available in the Australian PIT system. Tax planning and tax avoidance tend to favour
high-income individuals and income from capital. In 2002–03, for example, only 9%
of all individual taxpayers paid tax at the top marginal rate (CPA Australia, 2004:
18). For many high-income persons, their marginal tax rate is closer to the company
tax rate of 30% than to the maximum individual rate (including Medicare levy) of
46.5%, due to the use of private trusts, partnerships and companies, salary sacriﬁce,
negative gearing and income splitting (ACOSS, 2003: 20–22). Covick (2004) went
as far as using the term “two nations” to describe the differences between those
taxpayers who are part of the PAYG system and those taxpayers who use trusts,
partnerships and companies in a complex web of tax returns by the whole family
to minimise their overall tax liabilities. As a result, the actual overall progressivity
(and capacity to reduce inequality) of the Australian PIT system is nowhere as high
as suggested by the statutory tax scale.
A glaring example of the inequality of the system is the taxation of capital
income, where a dollar of income can be taxed in seven different ways depending
on the entity that receives the income and the concessions granted within the system.
One dollar of capital income can be taxed at:
(a) 46.5% if it arises from an investment held for less than one year;
(b) 30% if earned by a company;
(c) 23.25% if treated as a capital gain;
(d) 15% if earned by a superannuation fund;
(e) 0% if it is a superannuation fund capital gain;
(f) 11.675% if it is a capital gain of a small business; or
(g) 0% if the asset was an operating asset of a small business, was held for 15
years, and the proprietor is over 55 years of age.
A system which provides such a range of choices and tax regimes for an identical
item cannot be horizontally equitable.
11

Note that the ABS estimate refers to an upper bound estimate of underground activity
missing from GDP in 2000–2001, while Bajada’s estimate refers to the cash economy
in December 2000. A difference in the scope of the two approaches is that the ABS
estimate does not include illegal activity while Bajada’s estimate does.
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2.3 Efficiency

Efﬁciency in taxation is concerned with the loss in output resulting from tax-induced
distortions in taxpayers’ behaviour. A traditional criticism of the Australian PIT has
been that the maximum marginal tax rate (46.5%) is too high and the thresholds for
the top marginal tax rates in Australia are too low (relative to domestic earnings or by
international standards). These act as a disincentive to work effort and disadvantage
Australia in its international competition for skilled labour. However, the problem
of low thresholds for the top marginal tax rates has been substantially addressed by
recent federal budgets, which raised the two top thresholds, especially the highest
threshold, quite signiﬁcantly. Using Budget and ABS data, and making adjustments
for work related expenses, it is estimated that the top tax threshold as a multiple
of full-time average annual earnings has risen steadily from 1.5 in 2003–04 to 2
in 2004–05, 2.5 in 2005–06 and potentially over 3 in 2006–07 (Treasury, 2006;
ABS, 2006b).
More persistent is the problem of high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
caused by the interaction between the tax and social security systems.12 Australian
households that receive a composite income made of wage/salary and a social
security payment related to their family status or benefit category tend to face
very high EMTRs, which can be more than or close to 100% in some cases. High
EMTRs act as poverty traps, which discourage unemployed adults from seeking
work (unemployment traps), or employed adults from working longer hours (low
income traps). Recent changes announced in federal budgets have improved the
EMTR situation but more can still be done.
Concerning investment, the combination of the preferential treatment of owneroccupied housing, negative gearing and the CGT discount appears to encourage an
overinvestment in residential dwellings, particularly rental housing, with potentially
harmful consequences, especially when financed by high levels of debt.
2.4 Simplicity

Simplicity of taxation is concerned with the operating costs (compliance and
administrative costs) of the tax system. In this sense, the PIT system in Australia is
complex for two main reasons already stated. First, virtually all individual taxpayers
are required to lodge annual tax returns, irrespective of how simple or complex their
personal tax affairs may be. Secondly, the legal complexity of the PIT gives rise to
both high tax computational and planning costs. The growing legal complexity of
the PIT system in Australia is also clearly evidenced by the growth of the proportion
of individual taxpayers relying on the services of tax agents for the completion and
lodgment of their returns. This ratio has increased tremendously from approximately
12

In terms of interaction with the PIT, the following categories of social security payments
are relevant: unemployment benefits, family and child benefits, pensions and sole parent
benefits, along with a range of means-tested tax offsets like the low income offset and
the Medicare charge phase-in provision.
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38% to 40% in 1977–78 (McKinstry and Baldry, 1997) to around 74% to 77% from
1996–97 to 2003–04 (ATO, 2006). An OECD survey conducted in 2004 (relating
to the ﬁnancial year immediately before the survey year) showed that Australia
was the second highest agent-dependent country in the developed world (OECD,
2005, Table 9).13 A personal taxpayer14 survey conducted by an Atax research
team in late 1995 found that the most common reason (60.2%) for people seeking
professional tax advice is to comply with the legal requirements of tax obligations
(Evans et al., 1996: 12).
In this (now dated) comprehensive study of the compliance costs arising from
federal taxes, Evans et al. (1997: 20) found that, in 1994–95, personal taxpayers
(excluding sole traders), spent, on average, 8.5 hours per annum on tax affairs
and almost $100 on tax adviser costs. In aggregate terms, the compliance costs
accounted for 4% of the net income tax revenue collected from personal taxpayers.
This does not include the tax compliance costs associated with the use of trusts,
companies and partnerships for asset protection and tax planning purposes. When
sole traders were included, individual compliance costs accounted for 5.6% of the
relevant tax revenue (Evans et al., 1997: 65). Although there is no updated study of
PIT compliance costs, it seems reasonably safe to remark that, as the overall level
of complexity has increased, tax planning and compliance costs have not shown
any sign of declining.
The above summary discussion suggests that a comprehensive, systemic reform
of the Australian PIT is long overdue. The next section will discuss the principles
of tax reform and research methodology adopted in this ARC Linkage project.
3. PRINCIPLES OF TAX REFORM

It may be helpful to brieﬂy consider the meaning of tax reform prior to discussing
the guiding principles of PIT reform adopted in this paper. Despite its widespread
usage, the meaning of tax reform is neither well understood nor unambiguously
agreed upon.15 There are two fundamental difﬁculties in assessing whether a tax
change is a reform or not. Firstly, it is difﬁcult to measure with certainty the general
equilibrium impact of a tax change. Secondly, a genuine tax reform typically gives
rise to both winners and losers, so that it may be difﬁcult to determine the overall
and speciﬁc effects of the tax change under consideration. In this paper, tax reform
is identiﬁed and assessed in terms of the equity, efﬁciency and simplicity criteria
13

According to this report, 77% of all individual income tax returns in Australia were
prepared with the assistance of tax agents. Only Italy (with 96%) had a higher figure
than Australia. The percentages for other jurisdictions included: Canada: 45%; Ireland:
70%; Korea: 46%; New Zealand: 30%; UK: 53%; and USA: 56%.

14

Personal taxpayers mean individual non-business taxpayers (that is, sole traders are
excluded).

15

For a critical examination of the meaning of tax reform, the interested reader is referred
to Tran-Nam et al. (2006).
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for good tax policy. Given these criteria of assessment, the reform method adopted
in this ARC Linkage project is based on two general principles: revenue neutrality
and an incremental approach. Each of these will be elaborated in turn below.
Firstly, a specific tax reform can be either revenue neutral, revenue decreasing
or revenue increasing. This project adopts the principle of revenue neutrality for
three main reasons:
• politically speaking, it preserves the status quo as far as possible, so the
proposed reform is more likely to be accepted;
• it provides a safeguard to the level of government expenditure; and
• holding tax revenue constant makes it easier to determine whether the
proposed tax change is truly a reform or not (in this case we can focus on
whether the social and economic costs of taxation as a result of the proposed
change have reduced or not).
Note that the meaning of revenue neutrality is not unambiguous in the context
of Australian PIT reform. It is capable of several different interpretations. A revenueneutral PIT reform can be interpreted as a PIT change that keeps the PIT burden
(that is, ratio of PIT revenue over GDP) unchanged. It may also be interpreted as
a PIT change that holds constant the overall tax burden (that is, ratio of total tax
revenue over GDP). Since the GST has yielded more revenue than forecast, the
overall tax burden in Australia has increased slightly as a result of the GST-based
reform. Thus, a revenue-neutral PIT reform in this sense means a PIT change that
maintains the pre-2001 level of overall tax burden, which was about 31.5% of GDP
(see ABS, 2006a: 647, Table 27.13 and 670, Table 29.5).
In this paper, revenue neutrality is said to be achieved if the proposed PIT
reform package generates approximately the same amounts of forecast revenue
as the government PIT package, including bracket creep. Once chosen, revenue
neutrality then becomes a constraint of tax reform. Note that a tax change cannot
simultaneously satisfy revenue neutrality (in the sense of holding PIT revenue
collection constant relative to the current regime) and the distributional constraint
(that no group is worse off in the post-tax income sense as a result of the change).
We must accept the fact that under a revenue-neutral tax change proposal, some
groups stand to gain while others necessarily lose out.
Secondly, tax policy in any pluralistic, democratic society like Australia is
typically a result of the interplay between the government, industries, labour unions
and pressure groups that constitute the corporate state. The inertia of the tax system
is strong, so that tax reform is often a long, strenuous and divisive process fraught
with compromises and missed opportunities. But clearly the minimalist approach
to PIT change adopted by the Coalition Government so far is grossly inadequate.
Expanding the thresholds of top marginal tax rates and changes to the low income
offset and Senior Australian Tax Offset reduce some of the disincentive problems
associated with the PIT system, but are by themselves insufficient for developing
a sustainable PIT model for the future.
A slow approach involving continuous small adjustments can generate a perception
of uncertainty and/or instability and is therefore undesirable as a reform strategy. At
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the same time, the “big bang” approach which seeks to move the current tax system
to the “targeted” one in one large change is typically not possible, given the various
constraints16 (especially the informational constraint) facing the tax policy makers.
In particular, a big bang approach involving a radical PIT reform proposal such as a
flat tax is most unlikely to be accepted by the government or the community.
This paper argues that the most viable option for PIT reform in Australia is
the incremental approach. This approach seeks to move the current PIT system to
the “ideal” PIT system in a series of two or three carefully crafted tax packages.
This reform strategy is consistent with the advice offered by leading public finance
economists such as Cedric Sandford (1993: 228). The PIT reform proposal in
each stage of the process should be sufficiently familiar in terms of tax structure
to be well recognised and ultimately accepted by both tax policy makers as well
as the taxpaying community. Yet each reform proposal should also make visible
improvements to the PIT system in terms of well defined criteria to justify its
implementation. Because of the federal election cycle, the incremental approach
takes a long time to complete and needs to be commenced by a government that
enjoys broad electoral support.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As a way to move the PIT reform debate in Australia forward, this ARC Linkage
project employs an integrated, multi-stage research methodology. This approach
combines various research techniques in an innovative way to take into account
the views of virtually all stakeholders in the tax reform process: the researchers
themselves, other tax experts, taxpayers and tax practitioners. Each stage of this
research methodology is brieﬂy explained below.
The first phase of the project aims at finding a specific PIT package that can
be considered as a suitable candidate for the first stage of the incremental process
described above. It is conducted with the aid of STINMOD version 05B. STINMOD
is a microsimulation model of the Australian tax and transfer system, developed by
NATSEM at the University of Canberra. This static model can be used to assess the
immediate impact of policy changes on family incomes and government expenditures.
As a policy tool, STINMOD can produce simulated results at the individual level.
Thus, the distributional impact of a policy measure across different family types
can be assessed. At the same time, estimates of the aggregate outcome can be
derived by summing the individual results. This tool is widely used by Treasury
and other departments to estimate the impact of public policy changes. Details of
the components and assumptions of STINMOD are given in Lambert (1994).
The second phase of the project subjects some of the central issues and concepts
underpinning these models to scrutiny and analysis by a panel of international tax
experts (using a Delphi methodology), in order to establish strengths and potential
weaknesses in the models, and seeks to establish a consensus around one single
16

These include domestic political and institutional constraints, international trade grouping
constraints, distributional constraints and informational constraints.
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“preferred” model. The Delphi methodology, as commonly understood in modern
usage, “operates on the principle that several heads are better than one in making
subjective conjectures … and that experts will make conjectures based upon rational
judgement rather than merely guessing” (Weaver, 1971: 268). It is a dialectical
process designed to foster the exploration and distillation of expert opinion (Helmer,
1983). This Delphi methodology combines quantitative and qualitative techniques
to explore future possibilities in systematic and iterative rounds of anonymous
testing involving a panel of international experts. The experts have been drawn
from Australia and from countries with comparable PIT regimes, such as the UK,
the USA, Canada and New Zealand. These experts have responded to a series of
open-ended propositions relating to the design and operation of the PIT with a view
to establishing whether a consensus on key PIT reform issues can be developed.
The third phase of the project surveys tax community attitudes to this expertderived model in order to establish levels of potential resistance/acceptance by key
stakeholders. In particular, a large-scale mail survey of taxpayers and a large-scale
e-survey of tax practitioners will be conducted. The taxpayer questionnaire will be
sent by ordinary mail to about 4,000 Australian individuals selected at random and
stratified by their income levels. This questionnaire seeks to obtain participants’
demographic and economic backgrounds, their attitudes toward general PIT reform
options and, more specifically, their acceptance/rejection of the preferred PIT model
derived during the first phase of this project. Particular attention will be paid to
ensure that a minimum response rate of 20% will be obtained (for example, accurate
addresses, questionnaire design, pilot testing, cover letter) and a high degree of
representativeness of the effective sample (for example, through stratification of
the relevant population). The e-survey will be sent by email to about 3,000 tax
practitioners. The participants of this tax practitioner e-survey will be chosen at
random from the membership database of CPA Australia, the industrial partner in
this ARC Linkage project.
In summary, the three major methodologies involved – micro-simulation,
Delphi methodology and survey – feed off each other and into each other as an
iterative loop. The results of the Delphi study and surveys can be used to fine tune
or revise the preferred model to reflect the expert and community feedback.
5. PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM: A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL

This section reports on the process and ﬁndings of the ﬁrst phase of the ARC Linkage
project. In this process, the government’s 2006–07 PIT system for Australian residents
(as summarised in Table 2) is taken to be the benchmark for comparison. STINMOD
is ﬁrst used to simulate the aggregate revenue and distribution of disposable income
associated with this benchmark. STINMOD is then used to construct and test a series
of hypothetical PIT packages in order to establish which packages can best deliver the
required policy outcomes. Before proceeding to state the preferred model obtained,
it is worthwhile discussing brieﬂy the crucial features of STINMOD modelling and
the general approach to constructing PIT reform packages.
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TABLE 2
THE 2006–07 PIT STRUCTURE*
Taxable Income
$0 – $6,000
$6,001 – $25,000
$25,001 –$75,000
$75,001 –$150,000
more than $150,000
Low Income Offset
*excluding Medicare levy.
Source: Treasury (2006, Table 1).

MTR (%)
0
15
30
40
45
$600 for annual taxable income < $25,000

STINMOD contains most of the significant tax and social security elements,
and its database is drawn from the last population census. It is based on a number of
assumptions such as an inflation rate of 2.5% per annum, a population growth rate of
1.5% per annum and a taxable income growth rate of 3.5% per annum. STINMOD
is a static model in the sense that it does not take into account changes in labour
supply, saving and investment (second round effects) in response to changes in the
PIT–transfer system.17 As a result, the estimated results of any PIT package which
improves efficiency tend to be on the conservative side. STINMOD allows users
to vary the tax rate but not the tax base in an automatic fashion. To estimate total
revenue and distributional impacts arising from tax base broadening, additional
calculations using spreadsheets need to be made. The combined effects of tax rate
changes and tax base broadening are then obtained by adding the two separate
effects. This process yields a close approximation of the impact of a simultaneous
change in tax rates and tax base.
As stated previously, any revenue-neutral PIT package that exhibits a familiar
progressive tax scale is said to be feasible. Obviously there are many feasible PIT
packages that can be constructed by STINMOD. To discriminate feasible packages
further, we employ the well accepted principle of tax base broadening and tax rate
lowering. Base broadening helps not only to fund lower rates, but also to reduce
tax-induced distortions. Lowering tax rates, particularly EMTRs, may reduce the
obstacles to people’s willingness to work. This efficiency enhancing measure is
desirable, especially in the context of population aging that will confront Australia
in the future.
The current Australian PIT system has many special exemptions and deductions
which reduce the tax base, have little or no justification on efficiency grounds, add
to complexity and are of much more value to those on higher incomes. Three main
17

In a recent study of the impact of marginal tax rates on labour supply, Gruen (2006)
found that Australia’s high-income earners are less responsive to tax cuts than those on
middle and lower incomes.
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PIT base broadening measures are:18
• removal of most, if not all, deductions for work-related expenses;
• removal of concessional tax rates on capital gains; and
• limiting tax relief for negatively-geared investment deductions to income
and capital gains derived from those investments.
In terms of the rate structure, among these competing packages, it seems useful
to focus on a PIT package with the following properties:
• a lower number of tax rates, for example, three rates; and
• a smaller gap between the top marginal tax rate and the company tax rate.
Taking the current PIT–transfer system as the benchmark, STINMOD was used
to construct and examine a large number of hypothetical PIT packages. Using the
principles of incrementality and revenue neutrality as primary selection criteria,
and tax base broadening, lower tax rates and smaller number of tax brackets as
secondary selection criteria, our ‘preferred’ PIT package can be summarised in
Table 3 as follows.
TABLE 3
PROPOSED PIT PACKAGE*

Taxable Income
$0 – $24,599
$24,600 –$69,999
$70,000 or more
Low Income Offset
Work Related Deductions (WRDs)
CGT discount
* excluding Medicare levy.

•

18

19

MTR (%)
13
26
38
$900 for annual taxable income < $25,000
Remove all WRDs and provide a $300 rebate to
each taxpayer who claims WRDs
Remove CGT discount and exempt the ﬁrst
$5,000 of capital gains per annum

The main features of the proposed PIT package are as follows:
Tax base broadening: WRDs and CGT discount are practically abolished.
They are replaced by some simple and plausible rebate or exemption,
respectively. Due to the lack of disaggregated data, the effect of quarantining
interest deductions for negatively geared assets cannot be quantified with a
reasonable degree of accuracy. Thus, the partial removal of negative gearing
was not attempted at this stage of the project.19
Other base broadening measures could potentially include the removal of concessional
Fringe Benefits Tax treatment of motor vehicles, concessional tax rates on many forms
of lump sum remuneration, remote area concessions and income averaging. However,
these are not considered in this present paper.

If disaggregated data on negative gearing is made available by the ATO, the effect of
the partial removal of negative gearing can be modelled. This would be an appropriate
task for the next PIT proposal.
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Tax rate structure: The proposed statutory tax rate structure is somewhat flatter
than the benchmark structure. There are only three rates as opposed to five rates
in the current PIT system and the proposed top rate is lower than the current
top rate (38% vs 45%).
Tax free threshold: There is no tax free threshold in the proposed package.
Maintaining or increasing the current tax free threshold is very costly and
relatively more beneﬁcial to high-income individuals. The adverse effect of the
removal of the tax free threshold on low-income individuals is compensated
with an increase of $300 in the low income offset (from $600 to $900 for annual
taxable incomes below $25,000).
It is now time to examine the above PIT proposal more closely.

5.1 Revenue Impact
First and foremost, it is necessary to demonstrate that the proposed package is
revenue neutral in the sense that it generates approximately the same revenue as
the benchmark (the 2006–07 PIT system). This is shown in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4
REVENUE IMPACT PF THE PROPOSED PIT PACKAGE
($ MIL), 2006–07
Government loses from change in tax rates and thresholds
Government gains from removing CGT Discount
Government gains from removing WRDs
Loss from extra $300 low income offset
Final Impact: Government loses
Sources: STINMOD and authors’ own calculations.

5,609.96
–3,988.00
–3,544.65
2,655.00
732.31

Keeping in mind that the PIT revenue in 2006–07 would be close to $100 billion,
Table 4 shows that the proposed PIT package is approximately revenue neutral.
Note that the revenue gap between the benchmark and the proposed package tends
to be overstated due to the static nature of STINMOD. Since STINMOD does not
capture the efficiency enhancement of the proposed package (to be shown later),
the forecast revenue of the proposed PIT package would be slightly understated,
causing the revenue gap to be slightly overstated.
Strictly speaking, it is also necessary to demonstrate the revenue sustainability
of the proposed reform in the future. This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Suffice it to say that bracket creep and the broadening of the tax base would guarantee
revenue sustainability into the future.
5.2 Distributional Impact
The distributional impact of our PIT proposal, by disposable income decile and
family type in 2006–07, is summarised in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
CHANGE IN WEEKLY DISPOSABLE INCOME ($), 2006–07
Family type
Married with
Married with
Sole parent
no children
children
One
0.00
0.08
0.00
Two
4.24
3.80
1.63
Three
3.92
3.49
1.83
Four
4.17
1.30
1.39
Five
3.39
0.00
8.94
Six
1.24
3.07
10.34
Seven
0.77
1.30
8.54
Eight
5.78
6.14
13.39
Nine
10.02
5.56
7.10
Ten
–19.38
–11.65
6.87
Sources: STINMOD and authors’ own calculations.
Income decile

Single adult
0.00
3.56
3.51
1.30
0.33
6.09
9.53
17.01
13.08
9.94

Under the proposed package, Australian residents, except married couples in
the top income decile, are on the average either no worse off (people in the bottom
decile) or better off in the sense of disposable income. Since the proposed package
redistributes income from the top income group to lower income groups, the overall
level of post-tax income inequality (as indicated by a summary measure such as
the Gini coefficient) is likely to decrease.20

5.3 Efficiency Impact
STINMOD is unable to compute the efﬁciency gains or losses associated with any
PIT package. However, from a theoretical perspective, as our proposal has a ﬂatter
tax rate structure, it should have a beneﬁcial effect on labour supply. In particular,
the gap between the proposed top marginal tax rate (38%) and the company tax
rate (30%) is much smaller than that between the current top rate (45%) and the
company rate. This would greatly reduce taxpayers’ incentive to engage in wasteful
and distorting tax arbitrage and planning activities.
To substantiate the claim that the proposed PIT package has a lower tax rate
structure, the EMTRs for 10 different family types at varying levels of private
income are computed. The EMTR for a particular family type is calculated using
the following formula:
EMTR = 1 – Change in family disposable income/Change in family earnings
where disposable income is deﬁned as the total amount of income, including
government beneﬁts, received by a family, less any tax paid. Because of the
20

The estimation of the Gini index typically requires unit record data which is not available
from STINMOD.
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interaction between income tax and the social security system, the EMTR can be
close to or can exceed 100% at present.
The detailed EMTR results are presented in the Appendix. Without base
broadening, the proposed tax scale gives rise to higher EMTRs in only six cases
out of a total of 131 cases in this simulation exercise. In all other cases, the EMTRs
are either unchanged or reduced. When base broadening is taken into account, for
illustrative purposes, the EMTRS are estimated for a sample of only four major
family types. Since the top three disposable income deciles do not have ETMR
problems, we focus on the bottom seven deciles. Further, only the removal of WRDs
is taken into account, as CGT changes do not affect the bottom seven deciles. The
simulation results show that base broadening has no impact on the EMTRs faced
by those selected family types belonging to the bottom seven disposable income
deciles. The results in the Appendix suggest that, in terms of EMTR, the proposed
PIT package outperforms the current PIT system in almost all cases.
5.4 Simplicity Impact

An important beneﬁt of this PIT proposal is its simpliﬁcation potential. Tax base
broadening through a partial or complete removal of WRDs and CGT discount will
reduce compliance costs (both computational and tax planning costs) to personal
taxpayers, administrative costs to the ATO and revenue losses to the government
(arising from allowable deductions for the costs of managing tax affairs). Focusing on
WRDs alone, this is so because, under the existing structure, many personal taxpayers
claim WRDs (6.8 million claimants in 2003–04)21 and the time spent on keeping
records of deductions is the largest single compliance task performed by personal
taxpayers (see Evans et al., 1996: 37). Under a number of conservative assumptions,
Vu and Tran-Nam (2006) estimated the reduction in aggregate tax operating costs
of PIT due to the removal of WRDs alone at about $1.03 billion in 2002–03. This
monetary estimate does not include possible reductions in psychological costs that
may arise from the elimination of WRDs.
A further benefit is that the PIT proposal can pave the way for reduced annual
filing for personal taxpayers, especially those with less complex tax affairs, as
persuasively argued by Evans (2004). He identified key ‘enablers’ that permit a
simpler tax regime for most individual taxpayers in New Zealand and the UK:
• a small number of tax rates (sometimes without a tax-free threshold);
• a cumulative, comprehensive and accurate tax withholding regime at source;
and
• no deductions for work related expenses.
Since tax rate simplification and the removal of WRDs are already included in
the proposed PIT package, Australia simply needs to further strengthen its existing
21

This figure refers to allowed claims only. Those personal taxpayers whose WRD claims
are not allowed would also incur compliance costs in terms of record keeping and tax
return preparation.
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PAYG provisions (particularly in respect to contractors who are akin to employees)
and introduce a more comprehensive tax withholding regime on domestic interest
and dividend income.
6. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

The current Australian PIT system suffers from major weaknesses relating to the
traditional criteria for good tax policy. However, since tax reform means different
things to different people, ﬁnding a consensus among a range of diverse options
has proven very difﬁcult to date. Recognising the importance of PIT reform, the
ARC awarded an ARC Linkage grant to a research team at Atax, University of New
South Wales. The aim of this project is to develop a sustainable PIT which not only
achieves improved equity, efﬁciency and simplicity, but which also commands
greater community acceptance and support. To this end, the Atax team utilises
an integrated, multi-step research methodology which includes microsimulation
modelling, a Delphi study and large-scale surveys. This paper reports on the process
and outcomes of the ﬁrst phase of this project.
In the first phase of this ARC Linkage project, STINMOD, a microsimulation
model has been employed to construct and test a large number of feasible PIT
packages in order to establish which package(s) can best deliver the required policy
outcomes. The set of all feasible reform packages is defined by two principles of
reform: revenue neutrality and incrementality. The preferred PIT package broadens
the tax base by essentially removing WRDs and the CGT discount to fund lower tax
rates (top marginal tax rate of only 38%). The preferred package also removes the
tax-free threshold, but compensates those who would lose most by increasing the
low income offset from $600 to $900 per annum. This proposed package is found
to be revenue neutral and to substantially outperform the current PIT system with
respect to the traditional criteria for good tax policy. It improves the disposable
income of virtually all personal taxpayers and is less intrusive and distorting of
economic decisions than the current system. The proposed PIT package appears to
be an excellent candidate to move the reform debate forward.
PIT reform of a systemic and coherent nature is a long and difficult process.
The conception and enactment of tax reform requires strong political will and
control. Since the process of tax reform may involve several governments, it must
start as soon as possible. In fact, the current Federal Coalition Government is in
an excellent position to initiate this reform process. Politically speaking, it enjoys
broad electoral support and controls the Senate. Economically speaking, favourable
fiscal conditions currently prevail and the external imbalance has not yet created
an economic crisis. Thus, the time for PIT reform is now and it would be a sadly
wasted opportunity if the Government does not push ahead with comprehensive
PIT reform quite soon.
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF EMTRs BY FAMILY TYPE UNDER
ALTERNATIVE TAX REGIMES
Family type 1: Couple both working with no dependant
Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
20,436
23,972
24,596
24,960
35,256
35,724
99,996
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
83.9
68.9
61.5
80.5
95.5
35.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
81.9
66.9
72.5
76.5
91.5
31.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–2.0
11.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
19,084
24,960
26,416
28,548
31,772
35,724
38,428
51,220
74,984
90,688
94,744
99,996
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
63.0
82.0
90.9
102.9
95.5
35.5
55.5
31.5
41.5
71.5
41.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
61.0
78.0
86.9
98.9
91.5
31.5
51.5
27.5
39.5
69.5
39.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
19,084
24,960
28,548
32,396
35,724
37,024

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
63.0
82.0
94.0
102.9
54.0
35.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
61.0
78.0
90.0
98.9
50.0
31.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0

Family type 2: Couple both working with one dependant

Family type 3: Couple both working with two dependants

(continued next page)
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38,428
63,960
94,276
101,452
102,388
104,000

55.5
31.5
71.5
72.5
42.5
42.5

51.5
27.5
69.5
70.5
40.5
40.5

–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
21,268
24,960
28,912
31,252
39,988
74,984
99,996
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
15.0
34.0
54.0
35.5
31.5
41.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
13.0
26.0
50.0
31.5
27.5
39.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
0.0
–2.0
–8.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
19,084
24,960
26,416
28,548
31,772
35,724
38,428
51,220
74,984
90,688
94,744
99,996
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
63.0
82.0
90.9
102.9
95.5
35.5
55.5
31.5
41.5
71.5
41.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
61.0
78.0
86.9
98.9
91.5
31.5
51.5
27.5
39.5
69.5
39.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
19,084
24,960
28,548
32,396

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
63.0
82.0
94.0
102.9

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
61.0
78.0
90.0
98.9

Change in EMTR
(%)

Family type 4: Couple one working with no dependant

Family type 5: Couple one working with one dependant

Family type 6: Couple one working with two dependants

0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
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35,724
37,076
38,428
63,960
94,276
101,452
102,388
104,000

54.0
35.5
55.5
31.5
71.5
72.5
42.5
42.5

50.0
31.5
51.5
27.5
69.5
70.5
40.5
40.5

–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
22,360
24,960
31,564
34,164
38,428
51,220
90,688
94,744
99,996
104,000
102,388
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
15.0
34.0
54.0
35.5
55.5
31.5
71.5
41.5
42.5
42.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
13.0
30.0
50.0
31.5
51.5
27.5
69.5
39.5
40.5
40.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)

Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
22,360
24,960
34,268
37,024
38,428
63,960
94,276
101,452
102,388
104,000

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
15.0
34.0
54.0
35.5
55.5
31.5
71.5
72.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
13.0
30.0
50.0
31.5
51.5
27.5
69.5
70.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

Annual private
income ($)

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime

Change in EMTR
(%)

Family type 7: Sole parent with one dependant

Family type 8: Sole parent with two dependants

Family type 9: Pensioner aged couple with no dependant
0.0
6,032.0
12,532.0
13,572.0

0.0
40.0
67.1
52.3

0.0
40.0
82.4
67.6

0.0
0.0
–15.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0
–2.0

0.0
0.0
15.3
15.3

(continued next page)
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41.2
67.9
65.2
31.5
31.5
42.5
42.5

56.5
65.1
62.0
27.5
27.5
40.5
40.5

15.3
–2.8
–3.2
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0

EMTR (%) under
benchmark regime
0.0
50.0
75.0
74.0
66.6
16.5
35.5
32.5
42.5
42.5

EMTR (%) under
proposed regime
0.0
50.0
60.0
81.0
73.6
14.5
31.5
28.5
40.5
40.5

Change in EMTR
(%)
0.0
0.0
–15.0
7.0
7.0
–2.0
–4.0
–4.0
–2.0
–2.0

Family type 10: Single adult
Annual private
income ($)
0
1,612
6,500
11,544
15,028
20,852
24,960
49,972
74,984
104,000

© 2007

Disposal income
($ pw) without
base broadening
Couple 1 working with 2 dependants
Low income (13% MTR)
641.00
Middle income (26% MTR)
738.00
Upper income (38% MTR)
1,124.00
Couple both working with 2 dependants
Low income (13% MTR)
726.00
Middle income (26% MTR)
823.00
Upper income (38% MTR)
1,150.00
Sole parent with 1 dependent
Low income (13% MTR)
443.00
Middle income (26% MTR)
739.00
Upper income (38%MTR)
1,124.00
Single adult with no dependent
Low income (13% MTR)
291.00
Middle income (26% MTR)
426.81
Upper income (38% MTR)
1,025.00

Disposal income
($ pw) with base
broadening

EMTRs with
base broadening

644.77
736.43
1,111.95

Unchanged
Unchanged
Unchanged

729.77
821.43
1,137.95

Unchanged
Unchanged
Unchanged

447.72
737.43
1,111.95

Unchanged
Unchanged
Unchanged

295.72
427.78
1,012.95

Unchanged
Unchanged
Unchanged
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